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S U M M A R Y
Objectives: Since February 2013, more than 400 laboratory-conﬁrmed human cases of avian inﬂuenza A
H7N9 infection have been reported in mainland China. Little is known of the dynamics of this novel virus
in poultry and human populations, which is essential for developing effective long-term control
strategies for this zoonosis. The aim of this study was to evaluate the impact of screening and culling of
infected poultry on the evolution of the H7N9 epidemic.
Methods: A mathematical model for transmission dynamics of avian inﬂuenza A H7N9 virus in human
and poultry populations was constructed. Parameters in the model were estimated using publicly
available nationwide surveillance data on animal and human infections.
Results: By ﬁtting a two-host model, it was shown that screening for H7N9 in poultry and culling could
effectively decrease the number of new human H7N9 cases. Furthermore, the elimination of circulating
H7N9 virus is possible if an intensive, but technically feasible, poultry screening and culling policy is
adopted.
Conclusions: Screening and culling infected poultry is a critical measure for preventing human H7N9
infections in the long term. This model may provide important insights for decision-making on a national
intervention strategy for the long-term control of the H7N9 virus epidemic.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International Society for Infectious Diseases.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/).
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jou r nal h o mep ag e: w ww .e lsev ier . co m / loc ate / i j id1. Introduction
The ﬁrst case of human infection with a novel inﬂuenza A H7N9
virus occurred in mainland China in February 2013.1,2 By May 19,
2014, there had been 433 laboratory-conﬁrmed human cases.
Fever, cough, sputum, and shortness of breath are the most
common clinical presentations.3 More than 80% of cases have
involved patients who had been exposed to live poultry.4,5
Infection with this H7N9 virus frequently leads to severe, life-
threatening disease in humans. In contrast, this new type of virus
has very low pathogenicity in poultry.6,7
To prevent poultry-to-human transmission of this novel
reassortant virus, the health authorities closed live poultry
markets. The number of new-onset human cases with H7N9 virus
infection decreased rapidly.8 However, little is known of the* Corresponding author. Tel.: +886 2 3366 8035; fax: +886 2 2351 1955.
E-mail address: fangct@ntu.edu.tw (C.-T. Fang).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2015.11.003
1201-9712/ 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International So
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).dynamics of this novel virus in poultry and human populations,
which is essential for developing effective long-term control
strategies for this zoonosis.
The aims of this study were to develop a dynamic model for the
transmission of H7N9 virus in both poultry and human populations
in order to estimate the reproductive numbers (R0) of this virus and
to evaluate the impact of the screening and culling of infected
poultry on the evolution of the H7N9 epidemic.
2. Methods
2.1. Study design
A mathematical model to describe the transmission of avian
inﬂuenza A H7N9 virus among two hosts – humans and poultry –
was constructed. Parameters in the model were estimated using
publicly available nationwide surveillance data of animal and
human infections.ciety for Infectious Diseases. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
Figure 1. The two-host model of H7N9 virus transmission in humans and poultry. See text for the deﬁnitions of symbols and the dynamic differential equations.
Table 1
Numbers of human inﬂuenza A H7N9 infection cases in Shanghai, Zhejiang, and
Jiangsu
Time (week) Jiangsu Zhejiang Shanghai Total No.
of cases
Natural
logarithma
Feb 18 – Feb 24 0 0 1 1
Feb 25 – Mar 3 0 0 1 1
Mar 4 – Mar 10 0 0 0 0
Mar 11 – Mar 17 0 0 0 0
Mar 18 – Mar 24 6 0 0 6 1.791759b
Mar 25 – Mar 31 4 3 2 9 2.197225b
Apr 1 – Apr 7 3 8 9 20 2.995732b
Apr 8 – Apr 14 7 22 3 32 3.465736b
Apr 15 – Apr 21 0 12 0 12
Apr 22 – Apr 28 0 1 0 1
a Natural logarithm transformation of the total numbers of cases.
b Exponential phase (March 18 to April 14, 2013). The slope of the natural
logarithm transformation (for the total numbers of cases) over time is the rate of
exponential growth of the H7N9 epidemic in humans.
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It was assumed that the novel inﬂuenza A H7N9 virus can
spread rapidly among poultry and can be transmitted easily
from poultry to humans, but has only a limited capacity for
human-to-human transmission. A SIR modeling approach was
used; for each of the two hosts, there are three mutually
exclusive states: susceptible (S), infectious (I), and recovered (R)
(Figure 1).
2.3. The poultry host
The poultry hosts have three states: susceptible poultry (SP),
infected poultry (IP), and recovered poultry (RP). It was assumed
that the birth rate of poultry (mp) is equal to their natural turnover
rate in poultry-raising farms. Susceptible poultry are infected
through poultry-to-poultry transmission at a rate of bp. Infected
poultry have three alternative outcomes: natural turnover,
recovery, or culling (after detection of H7N9 virus in the farm).
Parameters gp and d represent the rates of recovery and culling,
respectively (Figure 1).
2.4. The human host
The human hosts also have three states: susceptible people
(Sh), infected people (Ih), and recovered people (Rh). It was
assumed that the birth rate (mh) of the human population is
equal to the natural death rate, which is estimated by the
inverse of life expectancy at birth. Susceptible people become
infected through poultry-to-human transmission at a rate of
bph. Susceptible people can also become infected through
human-to-human transmission at a rate of bh. Infected people
had three alternative outcomes: H7N9 infection-related death,
recovery, or natural death. Parameters m and gh represent the
rates of infection-related mortality and recovery, respectively
(Figure 1).
2.5. The interventions
The effect of screening and culling infected poultry at different
levels of intensity was modeled by adjusting the numerical value of
the culling rate d. The differential equations that describe the effect
of interventions are summarized below; SP, IP, RP, Sh, Ih, and Rh
represent proportions of the state among the total host popula-
tions, respectively.dSp
dt
¼ mpbpSpIpmpSp;
dIp
dt
¼ bpSpIpdIpgpIpmpIp;
dRp
dt
¼ gpIpmpRp;
dSh
dt
¼ mhbhShIhbp-hShIpmhSh;
dIh
dt
¼ bhShIh þ bphShIpmIhghIhmhIh;
dRh
dt
¼ ghIhmhRh;
8>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>:
2.6. Source of data
The information on cases of human infections with inﬂuenza A
H7N9 virus (Table 1) were obtained from the websites of the
Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (http://
www.chinacdc.cn/) and the National Health and Family Planning
Commission (http://www.nhfpc.gov.cn/zhuzhan/). The data in-
cluded residence, age, sex, and the date of illness onset (or the
laboratory conﬁrmation date). The date of illness onset of human
cases was estimated from the laboratory conﬁrmation date if the
information on the date of onset was missing, based on the average
interval of 1 week from illness onset to laboratory conﬁrmation.7
Table 2
H7N9 serological surveillance results in poultry-raising farms of Shanghai, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu, 2013–2014
Shanghai Jiangsu Zhejiang
Time Number
of
samples
Number
positive
Positive
rate (%)
Number
of samples
Number
positive
Positive
rate (%)
Number
of samples
Number
positive
Positive
rate (%)
April 2013 16 554 3 0.02 63 390 1 0.00 87 801 16 0.02
May 2013 0 0 0.00 20 786 0 0.00 0 0 0.00
June–July 2013 4401 0 0.00 15 620 0 0.00 0 0 0.00
August 2013 225 0 0.00 840 0 0.00 0 0 0.00
September 2013 3182 0 0.00 21 121 9 0.04 3394 0 0.00
November 2013 7951 0 0.00 4196 0 0.00 4051 20 0.49
December 2013 1252 0 0.00 5494 0 0.00 85 7 8.24
Early-January 2014 130 0 0.00 408 0 0.00 0 0 0.00
Mid-January 2014 0 0 0.00 2278 0 0.00 0 0 0.00
Late-January 2014 2556 0 0.00 10 101 0 0.00 9864 0 0.00
Early-February 2014 0 0 0.00 621 0 0.00 7375 0 0.00
Mid-February 2014 915 0 0.00 3666 0 0.00 890 0 0.00
Late-February 2014 207 0 0.00 10 334 0 0.00 2713 1 0.04
Early-March 2014 0 0 0.00 3210 8 0.25 881 0 0.00
Mid-March 2014 0 0 0.00 3505 0 0.00 0 0 0.00
Late-March 2014 218 16 7.34 7466 0 0.00 0 0 0.00
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numbers of family clusters and secondary cases, were obtained
from a cross-strait academic conference on H7N9 virus hosted by
China and Taiwan.9 The populations of Shanghai, Zhejiang, and
Jiangsu were obtained from the Wikipedia website.
The animal surveillance data were obtained from the website of
the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture (http://www.moa.gov.cn/). The
data included testing results for H7N9 virus among animals in
2013 and 2014 (Table 2).
2.7. Parameterization
Table 3 lists the parameters used in the model. The average
lifetime of the human is 75 years. Based on this, the value of mhwas
set as 0.00025641 (per week). The average life span of poultry (at a
poultry-raising farm) is 72 weeks, and mp was set as 1/72 (per
week). The median duration of illness in human cases is 7 days. A
recovery rate of 1 (per week) for both humans and poultry was
therefore assumed. The parameters for poultry-to-poultry, poul-
try-to-human, and human-to-human transmission, infection-
related mortality, and poultry screening–culling were estimated
using epidemiological surveillance data in human and poultry
populations.
3. Results
3.1. R0 of poultry-to-poultry transmission
Since H7N9 infection is asymptomatic in poultry, the poultry-
to-poultry transmission rate bp could not be estimated directlyTable 3
Values of parameter estimations in the mathematical model
Parameters Estimated
values
Deﬁnition (unit)
mp 1/72 Natural turnover rate in poultry (per week)
bp 1.582 Poultry-to-poultry transmission rate (per week)
gp 1 Recovery rate in poultry (per week)
d 1/6, 1/1.3 Rate of screening and culling in poultry (per week)
mh 0.00025641 Birth or death rate of humans (per week)
bh 0.07 Human-to-human transmission rate (per week)
gh 1 Recovery rate in humans (per week)
bph 5.3  106 Animal-to-human transmission rate (per week)
m 0.563 Infection-induced mortality in humans (per week)from the animal surveillance data. Instead, bp was estimated
from the rate of exponential growth in numbers of human H7N9
cases (Table 1) before the start of interventions. The rate of
exponential growth in numbers of human cases provides an
unbiased estimate of the rate of exponential growth in numbers
of poultry H7N9 infections, because the numbers of human
cases are driven by the numbers of poultry infections. The rate of
exponential growth of poultry infections was determined by the
poultry-to-poultry transmission rate bp minus the poultry
recovery rate gp .
10,11 Table 1 and Figure 2 show that the
numbers of new-onset and laboratory-conﬁrmed human cases
increased exponentially from March 18, 2013 to April 14,
2013 at a rate of 0.582 per week. Since the poultry recovery rate
gp is 1 per week, the best estimate for the poultry-to-poultry
transmission rate bp is 1.582 per week, and the best estimate for
R0 of poultry-to-poultry transmission is 1.582.Figure 2. The exponential growth of human H7N9 virus infection cases in
2013. Before the intervention started in late April 2013 (closing the live poultry
markets), the number of new-onset and laboratory-conﬁrmed human H7N9 cases
grew exponentially from March 18 to April 14, 2013.
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The rate of human-to-human H7N9 transmission was
estimated using the method for calculating the reproductive
number R when the human-to-human transmission is not
sustainable.12 To support the hypothesis that H7N9 did not
cause sustained human-to-human transmission, the epidemio-
logical surveillance data for human H7N9 cases were obtained
from the Chinese CDC. As of May 19, 2014, there had been a total
of 433 cases of human H7N9 infection in mainland China,
including 401 primary cases, 30 secondary cases, and two
tertiary cases.9 These surveillance data indicate that human-to-
human transmission of H7N9 is not sustainable. The above-
stated method was then applied to calculate the R0 of H7N9 in
humans from the surveillance data, which was 0.07. Details of
the calculation are given in the Appendix. The human-to-human
transmission rate bh was then obtained by dividing the
reproductive number R by the mean duration of infectiousness
(1 week). The best estimate for the human-to-human transmis-
sion rate bh is thus 0.07 per week.
3.3. Estimation of other key parameters
The case fatality rate of H7N9 infections is 36%,8,9 which is
equivalent to an H7N9 infection-related mortality rate of 0.563 per
week (see Appendix for details). It was also estimated that the
poultry-to-human transmission rate of H7N9 is 5.3  106 per
week (see Appendix for details). The mean frequency of poultry
screening in Shanghai, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu was once every
6 weeks in 2013. The screening frequency increased to once every
1.3 weeks (10 days) in 2014. When poultry infected with the H7N9
virus were detected, they were rapidly culled. Therefore, d was 1/6
(per week) in 2013 and 1/1.3 (per week) in 2014.
3.4. Trend in the H7N9 epidemic under different intervention
scenarios
By ﬁtting the data to the model, the trend in the H7N9 epidemic
under different hypothetical intervention scenarios was simulated.Figure 3. Predicted 10-year trend of the H7N9 epidemic in poultry and humans, if
none of the interventions are implemented. The x-axis represents time (in weeks)
after the initial outbreak of human cases on February 18, 2013. The y-axis
represents the proportions of infected humans (red line), infected poultry (blue
line), and recovered (seropositive) poultry (pink line) in human and poultry
populations. The denominator of the human population is set as 150 000 000 (total
population of Shanghai, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu).3.4.1. Scenario 1: No screening and culling of infected poultry
Figure 3 shows that the H7N9 outbreak in humans (red line) is
parallel to the H7N9 outbreak among poultry (blue line). After the
initial 2013–2014 outbreak, there will be several subsequent
outbreaks every 1.5 to 2 years. Eventually, H7N9 will become an
endemic disease in both poultry and human populations. The
H7N9 seroprevalence rate among poultry (pink line) will stabilize
at a level of 35%. H7N9 virus will persist in poultry, with continuing
occurrence of human H7N9 cases at a stable frequency in the
coming decades.
3.4.2. Scenario 2: Screening and culling of infected poultry every
6 weeks
Figure 4 shows that an intervention with a screening and culling
rate of 1/6 (per week) will decrease the peaks of the human
outbreak (red line) and poultry outbreak (blue line). The
seroprevalence rate among poultry in the endemic stage will also
decrease to 22% (pink line). Nevertheless, the H7N9 virus will still
persist in poultry, with a continuing occurrence of human H7N9
infection cases.
3.4.3. Scenario 3: Screening and culling of infected poultry every
10 days
Figure 5 shows that a more intensive but technically feasible
intervention with a screening and culling rate of 1/1.3 (per week)
will prevent subsequent outbreaks of H7N9 in poultry and
humans, and rapidly eliminate the H7N9 virus from poultry. The
seroprevalence rate among poultry will decrease rapidly to nearly
zero in the next 5 years. This will prevent the occurrence of new
human H7N9 infection cases.
4. Discussion
A dynamic two-host model for the transmission of H7N9 virus in
both poultry and human populations was successfully developed.
The key transmission parameters in both poultry and human
populations were estimated using publicly available nationwide
surveillance data of animal and human infections. The simulation
results indicate that without interventions, avian inﬂuenza A H7N9Figure 4. Predicted 10-year trend of the H7N9 epidemic in poultry and humans, if
screening and culling of infected poultry are implemented every 6 weeks The x-axis
represents time (in weeks) after the initial outbreak of human cases on February 18,
2013. The y-axis represents the proportions of infected humans (red line), infected
poultry (blue line), and recovered (seropositive) poultry (pink line) in human and
poultry populations. The denominator of the human population is set as
150 000 000 (total population of Shanghai, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu).
Figure 5. Predicted 10-year trend of the H7N9 epidemic in poultry and humans, if
screening and culling of infected poultry are implemented every 10 days. The x-axis
represents time (in weeks) after the initial outbreak of human cases on February 18,
2013. The y-axis represents the proportions of infected humans (red line), infected
poultry (blue line), and recovered (seropositive) poultry (pink line) in human and
poultry populations. The denominator of the human population is set as
150 000 000 (total population of Shanghai, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu).
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continuing occurrence of human H7N9 infection cases at a stable
frequency in the coming decades. On the other hand, an intensive
but still technically feasible intervention, with screening and culling
of infected poultry every 10 days, will rapidly eliminate the H7N9
virus from both poultry and human populations in the next 5 years.
The closure of live poultry markets is the initial intervention
used by health authorities to control H7N9 outbreaks. The closure
of live poultry markets works by reducing the contact between
people and poultry, and as a result, decreasing the poultry-to-
human transmission. The closure of live poultry markets
successfully decreased the number of new-onset human H7N9
infection cases in Shanghai, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu.8 However, for
economic reasons, live poultry markets cannot be shut down
permanently. Therefore, other intervention strategies need to be
evaluated. The results of this study show that the aggressive
screening and culling of infected poultry every 10 days could
rapidly eliminate H7N9 virus from both poultry and humans in the
long term. This provides an important insight for decision-making
on the national intervention strategy for the long-term control of
the H7N9 epidemic.
Compared with a previous modeling study on H7N9,13 which
also ﬁtted the model to numbers of conﬁrmed human cases, the
present study incorporated two additional sources of empirical
data to improve the accuracy of parameter estimation. The ﬁrst
was access to epidemiological surveillance data from the Chinese
CDC, which allowed the accurate calculation of the reproductive
number of H7N9 among humans as 0.07. This in turn led to a more
precise estimate for the human-to-human transmission rate bh,
one of the key transmission parameters determining the potential
of H7N9 to cause outbreaks. The second was access to more
comprehensive animal surveillance data from Chinese Ministry of
Agriculture. The peak seroprevalence rates in poultry samples from
Zhejiang and Shanghai (8.24% and 7.34%, Table 1) support the
present model, which predicts that up to 8% of poultry were
infected during the peak of the H7N9 outbreak before the
implementation of the intervention (Figure 3). This in turn allowed
us to obtain a more accurate estimate for the poultry-to-human
transmission rate bph, another key transmission parameter
determining the potential of H7N9 to cause outbreaks in humans.Two factors make it difﬁcult to obtain a realistic estimate of the
poultry-to-poultry transmission rate of H7N9 virus directly from
animal surveillance data. First, H7N9 infection is asymptomatic in
poultry.7 This precludes a syndromic surveillance among animals.
Second, screening data for asymptomatic poultry is far from
comprehensive. However, symptomatic human H7N9 infection
case data can provide an unbiased estimate for this important key
transmission parameter. This is because, when two different types
of host coexist, the number of new infections in the low-risk host
(human) will be driven by the epidemic in the high-risk host
(poultry). The rate of exponential growth in the numbers of new
low-risk host (human) cases will be identical to that of the number
of new high-risk host (poultry) cases. Therefore, it was possible to
obtain the estimate of the poultry-to-poultry transmission rate
from the slope of the natural logarithm-transformed numbers of
new human infection cases during the exponential phase, using
established methods.10,11
The rate of human-to-human H7N9 transmission was estimat-
ed using the method for calculating the reproductive number R
when the human-to-human transmission is not sustainable.12 This
method has been used successfully to estimate R of measles during
the elimination phase (1995–1997) in the United States.14,15 Just
like measles during the elimination phase in the United States, the
H7N9 virus did not cause sustained human-to-human transmis-
sion in China. Therefore, it was hypothesized that the same method
could be used to estimate the rate of human-to-human transmis-
sion of H7N9. To support the hypothesis that H7N9 did not cause
sustained human-to-human transmission, the epidemiological
surveillance data for human H7N9 cases were obtained from the
Chinese CDC.9 These surveillance data indicate that human-to-
human transmission of H7N9 is not sustainable. The above-stated
method was then applied to successfully calculate the R value of
H7N9 from the surveillance data as 0.07.
There are several important limitations to this study. First, data
of laboratory-conﬁrmed cases with H7N9 virus were used to
estimate some parameters. This may have underestimated the size
of the epidemic. Second, the animal surveillance data are very
likely to be incomplete, which precludes the use of these data to
make a valid inference on the range of parameters. Third, several
parameters, such as the human and poultry recovery rates, were
based on assumptions rather than empirical data. Finally, it was
assumed that the screening procedure has a high sensitivity to
detect all infected poultry. This assumption may be optimistic, and
may therefore have led to an over-estimation for the effect of the
screening and culling intervention.
In conclusion, this model shows that screening and culling of
infected poultry is the critical measure for preventing human
H7N9 infections in the long term. This model may provide an
important insight for decision-making on a national intervention
strategy for the long-term control of the H7N9 virus epidemic.
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